We investigate the design of incentives for quality provision in a dynamic regulation model where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. When the regulator hires a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to over-provision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction motive. When the regulator hires a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends crucially on the regulator's ability to transfer rents across periods. From a social viewpoint, contracting with a single agent with unlimited liability is preferable to contracting with a sequence of agents, even if no commitment is feasible. By contrast, if the agent has limited liability, the regulator is not able to extract future rents. Because quality physically links periods together, this generates a ratchet effect in spite of recurring private information, and shorter franchises are socially beneficial.
Introduction
The provision of quality by public utilities or, more generally, regulated firms, is one of the main objectives of regulatory activity. Besides securing basic services such as electricity supply or voice and data transmission, regulators attempt to incite regulated firms to provide adequate levels of service enhancements that affect final customers' welfare. For instance, the speed and clarity of transmissions are key dimensions of quality in the telecommunications sector, as is the reliability of supply in the energy sector.
The literature on the regulation of quality has mostly focused on static frameworks, with special emphasis on the issue of quality verifiability (see Laffont and Tirole, 1991 , Lewis and Sappington, 1991 , 1992 , and the survey by Sappington, 2005) . However, in many cases, the management of quality can be properly understood only in a dynamic context. For instance, the maintenance of a road or electricity network requires sustained efforts, while the network itself is subject to exogenous events which affect the quality of the service it provides to final customers. Similarly, the quality of water supply is affected by exogenous polluting activities, and requires continuing cleaning up efforts. In all these examples, the quality of the good or service provided evolves over time as a function of maintenance efforts and exogenous random shocks, and these efforts and shocks have long-lasting effects. As a result, quality is a durable characteristic, which can be viewed as a capital stock: the current quality of service depends on its past levels.
1 This paper analyzes the problem of optimal regulation of quality in such a dynamic environment. In this framework, we endeavor to shed light on the following questions: What is the best incentive scheme when the regulated firm's decisions affect the level of quality available both in the present and in the future?
Does private information systematically lead to under-provision of quality, as in a static environment?
Our analysis focuses on the case where quality is verifiable. That is, it can be described ex-ante in a contract and certified ex-post in court. As a result, the regulator can directly impose a quality target on the regulated firm, or more generally reward or punish the firm directly as a function of quality improvements. This is most relevant for industries such as electricity, where the number and intensity of outages can be ascertained in an almost costless way, or water supply, in which the chemical composition of water provides an accurate measure of its quality for final customers. 2 While quality itself is verifiable, we assume that the factors governing its evolution cannot be separately verified, and are private information of the regulated firm. Thus, in line with Lewis and Sappington (1991) , the regulator cannot determine the portion of overall quality that can be respectively attributed to the regulated firm's maintenance efforts and to the exogenous quality shocks. Quality shocks are assumed to be independently distributed across periods. Hence, the only link between periods is physical, rather than informational. For simplicity, we consider a binomial model in which only high and low quality shocks can occur.
Two regulatory frameworks are considered in turn. We first analyze the dynamics of quality in a stationary setup in which the regulator delegates the management of quality to a sequence of firms or agents, one for each period. This allows us to disentangle the question of quality dynamics from that of the provision of dynamic incentives, which is addressed in the second part of the paper. Each agent is protected by limited liability and hence must receive a nonnegative utility in each state of nature (Laffont and Martimort, 2002 , Chapter 3, Section 5). That is, no contract can be enforced whereby a truthful agent could incur losses.
Within each period, the timing is as follows. After signing a contract with the regulator, which depends on the current quality level, the agent in charge privately learns the current quality shock, and then privately chooses his maintenance effort. Transfers are then effected according to the achieved quality level.
Because the agents must receive a nonnegative utility in each state of nature, the fact that the quality shocks are privately observed by the agents leads to a sequence of non-degenerate moral hazard problems. The main difference with a static framework is that the social value of quality reflects not only its current social benefit, but also its impact on the continuation game played by the regulator and the future agents. Accordingly, maintenance efforts and transfers will vary over time with the quality of the good or service provided. Using standard recursive techniques (Stokey and Lucas, with Prescott, 1989), we characterize the social value of quality under both symmetric and asymmetric information. A key result of our analysis 2 As pointed out by De Fraja and Iozzi (2008), there have been in practice two types of regulatory responses to the problem of securing an adequate quality service (see also Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers, 1994) . First, the imposition of quality standards, enforced through legal sanctions. Second, the imposition of a link between the firm's allowed revenues and prices and the quality of the service it provides. For instance, in the UK water industry, price cap adjustments are based on comparative performance indicators (OFWAT, 2002) . Similarly, UK energy distribution companies receive financial compensations according to various quality indicators (OFGEM, 2001) . Note that these two types of mechanisms require at least some dimensions of quality to be verifiable by a court. Example of such contracts are discussed in Sappington (2005, Section 4.3). De Fraja and Iozzi (2008) propose an extension of the Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979) dynamic model of price regulation that allows for such price-quality tradeoffs. They do not address the issue of quality durability, which is the objective of this paper.
is that the marginal social value of quality is strictly higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. Indeed, the informational rent that the regulator must leave to the current agent in case of a high quality shock is decreasing in the current quality level: when quality is high, the agency problem becomes less severe. This implies that, relative to a static environment, the regulator has an additional incentive to enhance quality, namely to reduce future informational rents. In particular, she will take advantage of a high quality shock to demand a higher effort from the current agent. As a result, there may be over-provision of quality relative to the symmetric information environment, typically following a sequence of high quality shocks. Sharper predictions are derived using a linear-quadratic specification of the model. It is shown that, while private information leads to a lower average growth rate of quality, it also increases the variance of quality. In the long run, the range of possible qualities is wider under asymmetric information than under symmetric information, and thus both over-provision and under-provision of quality can persist asymptotically.
We next turn to the case where the regulator delegates the management of quality to a single agent, which raises the issue of dynamic incentives. On the one hand, repeated contractual relationships may be socially beneficial as the regulator can now punish or reward the agent depending on his past performance. On the other hand, because quality physically links periods together, providing incentives is more costly because the agent anticipates the impact of his actions on future rents. To simplify the analysis, we consider a two-period model; in each period, the agent privately learns the current quality shock, and then privately chooses his maintenance effort. We assume that both the regulator and the agent are unable to commit to a long-term regulatory arrangement: this captures the idea that the extent to which a regulator can commit future ones is often limited. Besides, we consider two types of participation constraints: in the first one, the agent must only be granted a nonnegative intertemporal utility, while, in the second one, the agent is protected by limited liability.
Our aim is to compare from a welfare point of view these two regulatory regimes to the case where the regulator contracts with a sequence of two agents Our main findings are as follows. When the regulator contracts with a single agent under intertemporal participation constraints, she is able to fully extract second period rents in the first period. By contrast, when the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, she does not have this ability to transfer rents over time. This increases total expected discounted rents, and leads to a lower ex-ante social welfare than when contracting with a single agent.
This comparison is reversed when the single agent is protected by limited liability. Indeed, not only this prevents the regulator from extracting second period rents, but a ratchet effect arises, reflecting that the agent is concerned that producing efficiently in the first period may jeopardize his second period rents. The regulator may now find it optimal to increase the agent's effort following a low quality shock in the first period. Indeed, doing so reduces the second period informational rent. This directly benefits the regulator, and also makes misreporting of a high quality shock less attractive from the agent's perspective in the first period, thereby decreasing the cost of dynamic incentives. Interestingly, this effect may lead to over-provision of first period quality following a low quality shock. A pooling outcome may even occur for a sufficiently high discount factor. This paper is in line with works that extend the analysis of incentives in regulation to a dynamic framework (Baron and Besanko, 1984 , Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole, 1985 , Laffont and Tirole, 1988 , 1990 , Lewis and Sappington, 1997) . In these papers, the source of the dynamics is that the regulated firm's costs are correlated across periods, so that the regulator progressively learns about the efficiency of the firm.
3 Instead of this, the intertemporal link stressed in this paper is purely physical and not informational, as quality shocks are independently distributed across periods. This implies that the correlation between qualities across different periods is endogenous, and depends on past quality shocks and maintenance efforts, as well as on past contracts.
Our setup bears some similarities with Lewis and Yildirim (2002) , who study the optimal regulation of firms who learn to use cost-reducing innovations over time. They show that a light-handed regulation may foster innovation, by allowing firms to earn greater informational rents while providing better service. Moreover, innovation may occur even in the absence of long-term agreements, provided private information is renewed in each period. Our model differs from theirs as we assume that private information takes the form of quality shocks that have direct permanent effects on consumer surplus, while, in their model, it is embedded in a transitory cost. Besides, Lewis and Yildirim (2002) do not study the impact of limited liability on the contractual relationship. In a related paper, Gärtner (2007) investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic setup where firms are privately informed on their learning rates, that is, on the extent to which higher output today translates into lower costs tomorrow. His setup departs from ours in that information on production costs is asymmetric only in the last period of a two-period contractual relationship.
Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1995) study optimal resource royalties when a mine owner delegates extraction to a mine manager with private information about his extraction cost.
They study how the standard Hotelling rule must be modified in order to discourage the mine manager from over-reporting his costs. As in this paper, the key intertemporal link in their model is of a physical nature: future extraction decisions are physically constrained by current ones, as the resource is non-renewable. In our model, quality also plays the role of a state variable, because of its durable nature. Yet, a distinctive feature of our setup is that it allows more complex dynamics for the evolution of quality, which can improve or regress over time as a function of quality shocks and maintenance efforts. Finally, the study of the dynamic rent extraction effect to which the evolution of quality gives rise is also a novel feature of our analysis. Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1996) consider a large class of models of dynamic adverse selection with history dependent outcomes. Strictly speaking, our model is not a special case of theirs, since it features both hidden knowledge and hidden
effort. Yet, Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1996) point out some difficulties that can more generally arise under no commitment in dynamic incentive models that feature a physical intertemporal link. We will discuss this aspect of their work later in the paper. 
The Basic Model
Our model departs in two ways from standard regulation models, such as those studied by Baron and Myerson (1982) , or Laffont and Tirole (1986 
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a depreciation factor, e t is the maintenance effort exerted by the date t agent, and θ t is the date t quality shock. The parameter δ measures the extent to which maintenance efforts and quality shocks have durable effects. We assume that the quality shocks {θ t } ∞ t=0 are independently and identically distributed across periods, with support {θ, θ} such that θ > θ ≥ 0, and we let ∆θ = θ − θ. For any date t = 0, 1, . . . , we denote by ν ∈ (0, 1) the probability that θ t = θ, and we let
An agent exerting a maintenance effort e incurs a disutility ψ(e) in monetary units. The function ψ is continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex over R + , and it satisfies ψ(0) = ψ ′ (0) = 0. It is analytically convenient to extend the function ψ to the whole real line by setting ψ = 0 over R − . To guarantee that the regulator's objective function is concave, we also assume that ψ has a convex derivative over R + .
Agents are compensated for their efforts by monetary transfers. Given effort level e t and monetary transfer u t , the date t agent's overall utility is
Each agent's outside opportunity is normalized to zero. In addition, we assume that, to accept working for the regulator, each agent must receive a nonnegative utility in each state of nature. An interpretation of this limited liability constraint is that agents have infinite risk aversion below zero wealth (Laffont and Martimort, 2002 , Chapter 3, Section 5).
As in Laffont and Tirole (1986) , distortionary taxation inflicts a disutility $(1 + λ) on consumers in order to levy $1 for the state, where λ > 0 is the shadow cost of public funds.
Hence, the date t net consumer surplus is S(q t )−(1+λ)u t , so that, by (2), the corresponding utilitarian social welfare is
The regulator is far-sighted and discounts future payoffs with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
By (3), the expected discounted social welfare at date 0 is thus equal to
We assume throughout that quality is verifiable, so that the regulator can reward or punish the agents directly as a function of quality improvements. By (1), this means that, at each date, the sum of the agent's effort and of the quality shock is verifiable. Under symmetric information, efforts and shocks are themselves verifiable. Under asymmetric information, neither efforts nor shocks are verifiable, as in Lewis and Sappington (1991) , while, at each date, the agent in charge takes his effort decision after observing the current quality shock.
4
3 Regulating Quality with a Sequence of Agents
Regulation under Symmetric Information
As a benchmark, we consider the symmetric information situation in which not only quality improvements, but also the extent to which these can be attributed to agents' efforts or to quality shocks are verifiable. Regulatory contracts can then be directly made contingent on agents' efforts. The existence of a shadow cost of public funds implies that agents receive no rent at the optimum, that is u t = ψ(e t ) for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1), (2), and (4), the regulator's problem is then to find a sequence of quality levels
, where each q t is contingent on the history of shocks (θ 0 , . . . , θ t−1 ) up to date t, that solves
given any initial quality level q 0 . This is a standard dynamic programming problem. The symmetric information social value function V * : R + → R is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation
where the controls (e, q, e, q) must satisfy the state transition constraints
and the feasibility constraints
Standard considerations (see, for instance, Stokey and Lucas, with Prescott, 1989) yield that the symmetric information social value function V * is bounded, continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave over R ++ .
An implication of ψ ′ (0) = 0 is that it is always optimal for the regulator to induce strictly positive effort on the part of the current agent, no matter the current quality level or the current quality shock. Hence, the feasibility constraints (7) are never binding. Denote by e * (q), q * (q), e * (q), q * (q) the optimal choices in (5), which are uniquely determined. The first-order conditions for (5) read as:
Since V * is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R + , it follows from (8) and (9) that
: for a given current quality level, a high quality shock today leads to a higher quality tomorrow than a low quality shock. Along with (6), (8) and (9) further imply that e * (q) < e * (q): an agent facing a high quality shock exerts less effort than one facing a low quality shock, and therefore receives a lower transfer. It should be noted that, as a result, the regulator benefits from a high quality shock.
Using again the strict concavity of V * and the strict convexity of ψ over R + , it is easy to check from (8) and (9) that the functions q * and q * are strictly increasing, while the functions e * and e * are strictly decreasing. Since ψ ′ (0) = 0 and lim q→∞ q * (q) = lim q→∞ q * (q) = ∞ by (6) , and since V * is bounded, (8) and (9) also imply that lim q→∞ e * (q) = lim q→∞ e * (q) = 0.
These properties reflect that the agents' maintenance efforts become less important from the regulator's viewpoint as quality improves. As a result, lim q→∞ V * (q) = lim q→∞
Regulation under Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the case in which neither agents' efforts nor quality shocks are verifiable. An asymmetry of information then arises because, once in charge, an agent becomes privately informed of the current quality shock. Since he has limited liability, eliciting this information from him is socially costly. 5 The task of the regulator is to design incentive schemes to mitigate the resulting moral hazard problem.
An incentive contract between the regulator and the date t agent specifies a transferquality pair for each realization of the date t quality shock, which we henceforth refer to as the date t agent's type. For a given quality level q, a contract is thus a 4-tuple (u, q, u, q).
Incentive compatibility requires that
Because of limited liability, the agent must receive a nonnegative utility in each state:
The optimal contract under symmetric information does not satisfy the incentive constraint (10) of type θ. Together with this constraint, the limited liability constraint (13) of type θ imply the limited liability constraint (12) of type θ. To maximize the expected discounted social welfare, we momentarily neglect the incentive constraint (11) of type θ, and later check that the solution thus obtained satisfies it.
be the rents left to each type under the contract (u, q, u, q), given current quality q. Constraints (13) and (10) become
where the function Φ is defined by
Intuitively, Φ(q, q) is the informational rent that must be left to type θ when type θ improves quality from q to q. Since ψ and ψ ′ are convex, Φ(q, ·) is nondecreasing and convex for any value of q, while Φ(·, q) is nonincreasing and convex for any value of q. 6 These properties ensure that the regulator's objective function is concave, and that the social value function is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
As rents are socially costly, it is optimal to let (14) and (15) be binding:
for all t = 0, 1, . . . . By (1), (4), and (17), the regulator's problem is then to find a sequence of quality levels {q t } ∞ t=1 , where each q t is contingent on the history of shocks (θ 0 , . . . , θ t−1 ) up to date t, that solves
given any initial quality level q 0 . By analogy with (5), the asymmetric information social value function V * * : R + → R is the unique bounded solution to the Bellman equation
subject to constraints (6) and (7) . The following result parallels Lemma 1. Like for V * , one can show that the asymmetric information social value function V * * is bounded, continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave over R ++ .
Again, the condition ψ ′ (0) = 0 implies that it is always optimal for the regulator to induce strictly positive effort on the part of the current agent, no matter his type or the current quality level. Denote by e * * (q), q * * (q), e * * (q), and q * * (q) the optimal choices in (18), which are uniquely determined. Then, the first-order conditions for (18) read as:
Since V * * is strictly concave and ψ strictly convex over R + , and since Φ(q, ·) is nondecreasing, it follows from (19) and (20) that q * * (q) > q * * (q). This implies that the neglected constraint (11) is satisfied by our candidate solution. Indeed, because (14) and (15) are binding, (11) is equivalent to Φ(q, q * * (q)) ≥ Φ(q, q * * (q)), which again holds since Φ(q, ·) is nondecreasing.
Because of the second term on the right-hand side of (20) , which corresponds to the distortion due to asymmetric information, the comparison between the effort levels e * * (q) and e * * (q) is ambiguous, unlike in the symmetric information benchmark.
Using again the strict concavity of V * * and the strict convexity of ψ over R + , together with the convexity of ψ ′ and the definition (16) of Φ, it is easy to check from (19) and (20) that the functions q * * and q * * are strictly increasing, while the functions e * * and e * * are strictly decreasing. The strict convexity of ψ over R + , along with the monotonicity of e * * , also implies that the informational rent of type θ,
is a strictly decreasing function of quality q. It follows from (19) and (20) that, as in the symmetric information benchmark, lim q→∞ e * * (q) = lim q→∞ e * * (q) = 0. By (21) , this implies that the informational rent of type θ vanishes as quality gets large, lim q→∞ Φ(q, q * * (q)) = 0.
The intuition for this result is that when quality improves, it becomes less important for the regulator to incite type θ to exert effort. In particular, lim q→∞ V * * (q) = lim q→∞
as in the symmetric information benchmark.
Remark Applying the envelope theorem to (5) and (18) yields that both V * ′ and V * * ′ are strictly greater than S ′ . Thus, in both contexts, the regulator induces a higher quality than she would in a one-period version of the model: because quality is durable, the benefits of supplying higher quality today arise directly through an increase of future consumer surplus, and, indirectly, through a reduced cost of supplying quality in the future. 
Comparing the Two Regulatory Environments
In our model, the social value of quality depends on the regulatory environment. We now argue that, as a result, asymmetric information leads to distortions in both types of agents' maintenance efforts relative to their symmetric information levels. To establish this, we first present some general results, and then study a linear-quadratic specification of the model.
General Results
To contrast the outcomes of the regulation game under symmetric and under asymmetric information, we compare the social value functions V * and V * * . The only difference between the Bellman equations (5) and (18) that implicitly define them lies in the informational rent λνΦ(q, q) that appears on the right-hand side of (18). As observed above, this rent is a nonincreasing function of the current quality level q. This suggests that, under asymmetric information, an additional incentive to increase quality is to reduce future informational rents. Accordingly, the marginal social value of quality is strictly higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information.
Proposition 1 For any
Along with (8) and (19) , Proposition 1 implies that q * * (q) > q * (q) for any q > 0. That is, for a given quality level q > 0, and conditional on a high quality shock occurring, the regulator induces more effort from the agent under asymmetric information than under symmetric information, e * * (q) > e * (q). The intuition is straightforward: given a high quality shock, the marginal cost of effort is the same in both regulatory environments, while, by Proposition 1, the marginal benefit of effort is higher under asymmetric information. In line with the dynamic rent extraction effect outlined above, the regulator therefore takes advantage of facing a type θ agent today to build better quality for tomorrow. This overprovision of quality contrasts with the prediction of a one-period model, in which type θ agents would optimally exert the same level of effort under symmetric information as under asymmetric information.
Because of the additional distortion term on the right-hand side of (20), we cannot in general rank the quality levels q * (q) and q * * (q) conditional on a low shock to quality. The intuition is that asymmetric information raises both the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of inducing more effort given a low quality shock. A robust prediction of our model is however that if sufficiently many high quality shocks occur, asymmetric information will lead to over-provision of quality relative to the symmetric information benchmark.
These differences between the two regulatory environments do not vanish in the long run. Specifically, let P * and P * * be the probability transition functions over quality levels respectively induced by (8) and (9), and (19) and (20) . That is, for each i ∈ { * , * * } and
is the distribution of a random variable that takes the value q i (q) with probability ν, and the value q i (q) with probability 1 − ν. Then, the following holds. For any initial quality level q 0 , the distribution of quality will converge weakly to the asymptotic distribution µ * or µ * * depending on the regulatory environment (Stokey and Lucas, with Prescott, 1989, Theorem 12.12). Since the upper bound of the support of µ * * is strictly larger than that of µ * , one will in the long run observe high quality levels under asymmetric information that cannot be achieved under symmetric information. Therefore over-provision of quality can persist in the former case.
The Linear-Quadratic Case
To obtain sharper predictions, we now impose some parametric restrictions on surplus and cost functions; specifically, we take them to be quadratic:
for some strictly positive parameters a, b, and c. 8 The specification (22) ensures that the social value functions V * and V * * are also quadratic:
for each i ∈ { * , * * } and some strictly positive parameters A i , B i , and C i , while the optimal policy functions q * , q * , q * * , and q * * are linear: (5) and (18) without taking this restriction into account. We then check under which conditions and over which ranges the resulting analytical solutions are economically meaningful. The appropriate parameter restrictions amount to make θ, ∆θ, and q 0 small enough, see the Appendix for a precise statement.
To determine the optimal policy functions, what matters are the values of A * , B * , A * * , and B * * . These are easily obtained by inserting the policy functions (24) to (27) into the Bellman equations (5) and (18), and then using (23) to identify terms. An immediate result is that the coefficients B * and B * * coincide, B * = B * * = B. This reflects the property that, in the linear-quadratic specification, the informational rent Φ(q, q) is a linear function of (q, q):
Since the marginal social value of quality is higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information, one has A * * > A * .
An implication of (24) to (27) is that asymmetric information increases the wedge between qualities following a high and a low quality shock, q * * (q) − q * * (q) > q * (q) − q * (q). Our next result strengthens this insight.
Proposition 3 In the linear-quadratic case, the quality spread is larger under asymmetric information than under symmetric information:
The intuition for this result can be grasped by comparing the objective functions of the regulator in (5) so that the higher marginal social benefit of quality due to asymmetric information does not fully offset the incentive cost given a low quality shock. As shown by (29) , this simultaneously leads to over-provision of quality following a high quality shock, q * * (q) > q * (q), and to underprovision of quality following a low quality shock, q * (q) > q * * (q). While the first effect reflects a dynamic rent extraction motive, as discussed in Section 3.3.1, the second effect reflects a static rent extraction motive: the regulator induces less maintenance effort from a type θ agent in order to reduce the rent she would have to leave today to a type θ agent. Proposition 3 shows that this static effect dominates the dynamic effect. As can be checked from (26) and (27) , this may cause a type θ agent to exert more effort than a type θ agent given the same current quality level, thus reversing the prediction of the symmetric information benchmark.
In light of these results, it is natural to investigate which of the static or the dynamic rent extraction motives dominates from an ex-ante perspective. To this end, we examine the time-series properties of quality in the two regulatory environments. Denote by {q * t } ∞ t=0 and {q * * t } ∞ t=0 the stochastic processes of quality under symmetric and asymmetric information. Then, the following holds.
Proposition 4 In the linear-quadratic case, quality grows at a lower expected rate and with a higher variance under asymmetric information than under symmetric information:
From an ex-ante perspective, the static rent extraction motive therefore dominates the dynamic rent extraction motive, and asymmetric information leads to on average lower and more volatile quality growth. These properties carry over to the long run. For each 
Proposition 5 In the linear-quadratic case, in the long run, quality is on average lower and its variance is higher under asymmetric information than under symmetric information:
E µ * > E µ * * ,(32)Var µ * * > Var µ * .(33)
Regulating Quality with a Single Agent
So far, we have assumed that the regulator can only contract with a sequence of agents. We now investigate what happens when she can contract with the same agent over time. In contrast with the multiple agent case, the regulator can give the agent dynamic incentives to exert effort. However, the fact that the latter anticipates the impact of his actions on future quality, and therefore on the continuation of the contract, induces a cost for the regulator.
We assume throughout that neither the regulator nor the agent can commit to a long-term contract. 9 We compare the case where the agent has limited liability, so that contracts must grant him a nonnegative period utility at each date and in each state, with the case where no such lower bound on rents left to the agent is imposed, and contracts must only grant him a nonnegative intertemporal utility at each date and in each state. Our purpose is to compare from a welfare point of view these two regulatory environments to the case of regulation with a sequence of agents. To simplify the analysis, we now assume that, in any of the scenarios considered, including the multiple agent case, the contractual relationship only lasts two periods: the agent(s) exert(s) effort at dates 0 and 1 to provide quality at dates 1 and 2. The model remains otherwise the same as in Section 2.
Incentive and Participation Constraints
A key implication of the lack of commitment is that the date 1 contract offered by the regulator must be sequentially rational. Thus, it cannot be contingent on the agent's date 0 type, which is payoff irrelevant at date 1. As a result, the agent's date 0 type affects the date 1 contract only through date 1 quality q 1 . Solving for the optimal date 1 contract is immediate.
By analogy with (17), the date 1 rent of the agent is
date 2 quality levels are given by two functions q * * 2 and q * * 2 , which, by analogy with (19) and (20) , are implicitly defined by
This optimal date 1 contract is thus the same as in the two-period model with a sequence of agents. For a given initial quality level q 0 , a date 0 contract is a 4-tuple (U 0 , q 1 , U 0 , q 1 ) of date 0 rents and date 1 quality levels. Incentive compatibility at date 0 now requires that
Observe that, in our setup, and despite the lack of commitment, if the agent misrepresents his type at date 0, he will still contract with the regulator at date 1 and earn a strictly positive rent on average: a "take-the-money-and-run" strategy is not profitable, reflecting that types are independent across periods. This constitutes a key difference with standard dynamic adverse selection models with correlated types and no commitment (see, for instance, Laffont and Tirole, 1988).
As for date 0 participation constraints, either the date 0 contract must only deliver the agent a nonnegative intertemporal utility:
or only date 0 contracts that deliver him a nonnegative period utility can be enforced:
Observe that the limited liability constraints (40) and (41) are the same as in the two-period model with a sequence of agents. The difference is that, in the latter case, the date 0 incentive compatibility constraints read as
The regulator's objective at date 0 is to maximize expected discounted social surplus, net of total rents λ
. Because types are independent across periods, the standard monotonicity property of quantities is preserved in all cases.
Lemma 1
In any regulatory regime, q 1 ≥ q 1 in the optimal contract.
Remark It should be noted that, when writing the participation constraints as (38) and (39), we make the implicit assumption that, if the agent refuses the contract at date 0, then he is not hired by the regulator at date 1. This is a credible threat if there is a large pool of potential agents which the regulator can choose from at date 0. By contrast, if there were only one potential agent, and this indispensable agent turned down the offer of the regulator at date 0, then the principal could not commit not to rehire him at date 1. As pointed out by Gaudet, Lasserre, and Long (1996) in the context of dynamic adverse selection models with history dependent outcomes, this would imply that the agent's participation constraints cannot be written in the usual way, as the agent's reservation utility would depend on past
outcomes. An additional difficulty in our setup is that, if type θ refused the date 0 contract, then his continuation utility would be νβΦ(δq 0 + θ, q * * 2 (δq 0 + θ)): because quality depends on shocks no matter the agent's effort, the agent's reservation utility would be type dependent.
We sidestep these difficult issues by assuming that there is competition between potential agents at date 0.
Case 1: Intertemporal Participation Constraints
We first consider the case where the regulator maximizes date 0 welfare under the incentive compatibility constraints (36) and (37), and the intertemporal participation constraints (38) and (39). As usual, the incentive constraint (36) of type θ together with the participation constraint (39) of type θ imply the participation constraint (38) of type θ, and the incentive compatibility constraint (37) of type θ can be neglected. Since rents are socially costly, it is optimal to let (36) and (37) be binding, which leads to the following expressions for the date 0 rents left to each type of agent:
Observe that, for fixed quality levels q 1 and q 1 , these rents are less than those that would have to be left to the date 0 agent in the model with a sequence of agents, namely the static informational rent Φ(q 0 , q 1 ) for type θ, and a zero rent for type θ. Indeed, as shown by (42) and (43), the expected discounted date 1 rents νβΦ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )) and νβΦ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )) are fully appropriated by the regulator at date 0. This ability of the regulator to extract the agent's date 1 rent follows directly from the assumptions that types are independent across periods and that no lower bounds on the date 0 rents of the agent are imposed, as in Baron and Besanko (1984) . Yet, a key difference with their model is that the parties cannot commit at date 0 to a date 1 contract, which precludes them from implementing the optimal symmetric information allocation at date 1. From (42) and (43), total expected discounted rents amount to λνΦ(q 0 , q 1 ). By contrast, for fixed quality levels q 1 and q 1 , they
were facing a sequence of agents; this reflects that, in this case, the regulator would not be able to compensate the costs of providing incentives at date 1. The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 6 The ex-ante social welfare is higher when the regulator contracts with a single agent under the intertemporal participation constraints (38) and (39), than when she
contracts with a sequence of agents.
Case 2: Limited Liability Constraints
Consider now the case where the regulator maximizes date 0 welfare under the incentive compatibility constraints (36) and (37), and the more stringent limited liability constraints (40) and (41). Given that, by analogy with the model with a sequence of agents, the date
) is strictly decreasing in date 1 quality q 1 , it is easy to check that (36) and (41) imply (40) provided that q 1 ≥ q 1 . Neglecting (37) and adding this inequality as a constraint to the regulator's problem, one can then solve for the optimal date 0 contract in a completely standard way. Since rents are socially costly, it is optimal to let (36) and (41) be binding, which leads to the following expressions for the date 0 rents left to each type of the agent:
For fixed quality levels q 1 and q 1 such that q 1 > q 1 , the date 0 rent of an agent of type θ at date 0 is now strictly greater than the one that would have to be left to a date 0 agent of type θ in the model with a sequence of agents. Observe that (44) has a natural interpretation:
the first term on the right-hand side is a standard static informational rent, while the second term represents the expected discounted gain in terms of date 1 rents from pretending to be a type θ agent rather than a type θ agent at date 0. Straightforward manipulations imply that the incentive compatibility constraint (37) of type θ can be rewritten as
which is satisfied as long as q 1 ≥ q 1 .
Although the complications that typically arise in standard dynamic adverse selection models with correlated types and no commitment are absent from this model, the lack of commitment still generates a ratchet effect. Indeed, since the regulator cannot commit to a compensation scheme at date 1, an agent of type θ at date 0 anticipates that, by revealing his type, he will reduce his date 1 rent, since
That is, the agent anticipates that being efficient today will increase the level of quality tomorrow and therefore jeopardize his continuation rent, in line with the rent extraction effect that takes place in the model with a sequence of agents. In the model with the intertemporal participation constraints (38) and (39), this did not matter because the regulator was in any case able to fully capture date 1 rents at date 0. As shown by (44) and (45), this is no longer the case under the more stringent limited liability constraints (40) and (41). Total expected discounted rents amount to λν
, which, because of (46), is more than if the regulator were facing a sequence of agents; this reflects that, in this case, the regulator would face no ratchet effect. The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 7 The ex-ante social welfare is lower when the regulator contracts with a single agent under the limited liability constraints (40) and (41), than when she contracts with a sequence of agents.
Hence, under no commitment and limited liability, the regulator is better off contracting with a sequence of agents than hiring a single agent. This contrasts with Lewis and Yildirim (2002, Proposition 4). In their learning-by-doing model, the regulator prefers dealing with a single supplier rather than relying on less durable franchises when supply costs decrease with past production. This reflects that, the longer the contractual relationship lasts, the less costly it is for the regulator to demand more service, because the firm expects to be compensated by higher future profits accruing on an extended horizon. In our model, by contrast, future rents are lower when current quality increases. Under limited liability, this leads to a ratchet effect that increases the incentive cost of hiring a single agent.
One should notice that the equilibrium rents can be decomposed into two terms: a static component, λνΦ(q 0 , q 1 ), and a dynamic component, λνβΦ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )). While the former is nondecreasing in q 1 , the latter is strictly decreasing in q 1 . As in the model with a sequence of agents, this reflects a dynamic rent extraction motive. The logic is quite different, however.
When there is a sequence of agents, the regulator typically wants to increase the quality produced by a type θ agent at date 0 in order to decrease the rents that she has to concede at date 1, regardless of date 0 incentives. By contrast, when there is a single agent with limited liability, the regulator may want to increase the quality produced by an agent of type θ at date 0, in order to make a deviation less attractive for an agent of type θ at date 0. When β is large enough, 10 this can in turn lead to over-provision of date 1 quality by an agent of type θ at date 0, and even ultimately cause the date 0 incentive compatibility constraint of such an agent to bind, which results in a pooling outcome at date 0. 
Can Replacing the Incumbent Agent Ever Be Optimal?
So far, we have assumed that the regulator is bound to hire the same agent for two periods.
We now investigate what happens if the choice to keep or to replace the incumbent agent is endogenous, and depends on the date 1 outcome. Specifically, we focus on the case where, with some probability, the regulator can hire a new agent at date 1 if the incumbent turns out to be of type θ at date 0. Since quality shocks are independently distributed across periods, and the regulator cannot commit at date 0 to a date 1 contract, whether the incumbent is kept or replaced has no impact on the contract that the regulator offers at date 1. In particular, given date 1 quality q 1 , the agent in charge at date 1 receives a rent Φ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )) if his date 1 type is θ, and no rent otherwise.
The key feature of this new setup lies in the date 0 constraints. Let x be the probability with which the incumbent is kept at date 1 when he is of type θ at date 0. Observe that, since the regulator is indifferent at date 1 between keeping or replacing the incumbent, there is no need for her to commit at date 0 to a particular value of the probability x. Incentive compatibility at date 0 now requires that
As for date 0 participation constraints, we focus on the case where the date 0 contract must deliver the incumbent a nonnegative intertemporal utility:
Observe that, when x = 1, we are back to the model of Section 4.2. Is is easy to check that (47) and (50) imply (49). Moreover, it can be shown along the lines of Lemma 3 that (47) and (48) imply that q 1 ≥ q 1 . Proceeding as in Section 4.3 then leads to the following 11 As shown in the supplement to this paper, these effects are also at work when both parties can commit to a long-term contract, subject to limited liability. The analysis of this case is however much more complex to handle than under no commitment, because the optimal long-term contract now exhibits memory. Laffont and Martimort (2002, Chapter 8, Section 1) study the impact of limited liability in a repeated agency model where the link between periods is purely informational.
expressions for the date 0 rents left to each type of the incumbent:
For fixed quality levels q 1 and q 1 , the date 0 rent of an incumbent of type θ at date 0 is the same as when x = 1, while the date 0 rent of an incumbent of type θ at date 0 is strictly higher than in this case. Since, whether or not she keeps at date 1 an incumbent that turned out to be of type θ at date 0, the regulator must pay a rent Φ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )) at date 1, this means that the lower x, the less she can extract the expected discounted date 1 rent νβΦ(q 1 , q * * 2 (q 1 )) at date 0. Total expected rents amount to λν
which, if x ∈ (0, 1), is strictly more than when she contracts with a single agent under the intertemporal participation constraints (38) and (39). The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 8 The ex-ante social welfare when the regulator contracts with the incumbent agent under the intertemporal participation constraints (49) and (50) is maximized when
x = 1, so that it is never optimal for the regulator to replace the incumbent.
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the optimal regulation of quality in a dynamic framework where endogenous efforts and exogenous shocks have long-lasting effects on the quality of service. If the regulator hires a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to over-provision of quality, unlike in a static environment. In a parametric example, we showed that asymmetric information may also amplify the impact of quality shocks, leading to more volatile quality growth than under symmetric information. If the regulator hires a single agent, the optimal regulatory contract depends closely on the liability rule. When the agent is protected by limited liability, the regulator is unable to extract future rents. Because quality is persistent, these rents vary negatively with the current quality level. This leads to a ratchet effect, as the agent fears that exerting high effort in the current period would reduce his future rents.
In that case, ex-ante social welfare is lower than if the regulator hired a sequence of agents, which provides an argument in favor of shorter franchises.
Our analysis highlights that several aspects are relevant when assessing the performance of regulated industries regarding the quality of the goods or services they provide.
First, quality is persistent over time and is partially determined by past maintenance efforts and exogenous shocks. Regulators should take this into account in the contracts they offer to regulated firms. Besides, this dimension is yet to be incorporated in the empirical literature on the efficiency of regulatory arrangements. This is likely to be an important issue in the sectors where the impact of asymmetric information has been investigated empirically, such as, in particular, water utilities (Wolak, 1994) , or public transportation (Gagnepain and Ivaldi, 2002 ).
Second, it may be misleading to interpret high levels of quality as an unambiguous indicator of an efficient provision of quality. Indeed, our results show that asymmetric information may lead to over-provision of quality relative to the first-best, due to a dynamic rent extraction effect. Hence, high quality levels may reflect inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. 12 Another important insight of our analysis is that a highly variable quality does not necessarily reveal an erratic management of quality; instead, it may reflect an amplification of shocks due to asymmetric information.
Third, our results suggest that the terms of the financial constraints faced by regulated firms providing durable quality play a crucial role. In particular, limited liability clauses may be detrimental as they can give rise to a ratchet effect. This points to a possible empirical investigation of our model, that would examine the impact on regulatory contracts of bankruptcy laws and of the characteristics of the financial markets. As we have shown, if regulated firms are protected by limited liability, it would actually be preferable for the regulator to hire short-term contractors. By contrast, the regulator would rather enter into long-term contractual arrangements when firms can cover current losses by future profits.
Therefore our model predicts that less stringent financial constraints should result in more durable regulatory arrangements.
This paper abstracts from several important features of quality regulation, which should be investigated in future work. We considered a project of fixed size, thereby focusing on quality as the sole dimension of differentiation. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to the case where consumers care about both the quantity and the quality of output, in order to explore the trade-off between the level and the quality of service. Another interesting extension of the analysis would be to relax the assumption that quality is verifiable, by allowing only imperfect signals of quality to be ascertained in court.
Finally, the techniques and insights developed in this paper might also be applied to the study of other dynamic agency relationships, in which, as in our model, the cost of providing incentives is affected by an endogenous state variable. For instance, the owner of a flat or a building might be concerned with the maintenance efforts exerted by the successive renters, as well as with their unobserved characteristics-they may for instance be careful or careless.
The state of the property would then vary over time as a function of the successive renters' types and maintenance efforts, while its value would be endogenously determined by the whole sequence of rental contracts offered by the owner. As in our model, a succession of careful renters may increase the state of the property over and above the first-best level. In this context, it might be interesting to endogenize the sequence of renters' types by studying the incentives of different types of renters to select properties of different qualities, and the impact of this self-selection mechanism on the value of property over time. These important questions are left for future research.
it follows in a similar way from (A.2) and (A.5) that g (23) to (27) , and identifying terms in q 2 in (5) and (18),
we first obtain that B * = B * * = B, where B is the strictly positive solution to
Next, identifying terms in q in (5) and (18), we obtain that 
where the first inequality follows from (A.12) and the fact that q * * + < a b
, and the second inequality follows from (A.11). Hence, efforts conditional on a high quality shock are strictly positive, and since e * (q) > e * (q), so are efforts conditional on a low quality shock under symmetric information. To conclude, we must check that e * * (q) ≥ ∆θ for all q ∈ [0, q * * + ], so that we are justified in using the quadratic specification of ψ when writing down the informational rent of type θ, see (28) . From (27) , we have 
Hence, a sufficient condition for e * * (q) ≥ ∆θ to hold for all q ∈ [0, q * * + ] is that
Note from (A.7) that B is independent of θ, θ, and ∆θ. Hence, given (A.11), (A.13) typically holds if ∆θ is small enough. It is straightforward to find parameter values such that (A. 10) and (A.13) simultaneously hold.
Proof of Proposition 4.
From (24) to (27) as is easy to check from (24) to (27) .
Proof of Proposition 5. It follows from (24) to (27) 
